#WE CHOOSE NOW: DEMOCRACY POLICY PLAYBOOK

Louisiana
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TAPROOT EARTH

climate + community project

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The rate of incarceration in Louisiana is higher than anywhere else in the world. Black people are 33% of the state's population, but make up 52% of people in jail and 67% of people in prison.[1] Despite crime reductions in the last four decades in Louisiana, the prison population has quadrupled– with 40% of Louisiana's prisoners sentenced for non-violent drug or property crimes. Racist policies and practices at all stages of the "justice" process disadvantage Black people, including through disparities in technically "race-neutral" laws and Louisiana's reliance on pretrial incarceration. This practice of incarcerating people for their inability to pay bail, which is three times higher in Louisiana than the national average, criminalizes poverty and directly contradicts the point of the "justice" system itself— namely, to keep people and communities safe and stable. Despite efforts to reform the carceral system and reduce mass incarceration in the state, Louisiana remains a site of one of the highest incarceration rates in the world.

Louisiana is also particularly vulnerable to the climate crisis, due to its geographic location on the Gulf South and its production of the fossil fuels that drive the climate crisis and poison nearby communities. Louisiana is at high risk for sea level rise, coastal loss and flooding, increased heat waves, and storms that are increasing in frequency and intensity. In a region where safety and stability from the climate crisis is a struggle for all people, baseline social factors like health, wealth, mobility, and marginalization make some communities– particularly working class communities of color, incarcerated people, unhoused people, people who can't afford to evacuate or already face housing instability, and more– more vulnerable than wealthier and often whiter communities.

Ruth Wilson Gilmore defines racism as: "the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death."[2] By this definition, policing and incarceration are both environmentally unjust and racist.[3] The

1. Vera Institute for Justice, "Incarceration Trends in Louisiana," December 2019, https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-trends-louisiana.pdf.

2. Ruth Wilson Gilmore, *Golden Gulag; Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California*, (Uni. of California Press, 2007), https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520242012/golden-gulag.

3. Elijah J. Baker, Fabiana R. Lake, and Cambria Wilson, "Rooted in Oppression: Why the U.S. Policing and Carceral Systems Are Issues of Systemic Environmental Injustice," *Environmental Justice* 14, no. 6 (2021), https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/env.2021.0031.

carceral system exposes incarcerated people, and the communities to which they will return, to the worst effects of extreme heat and storms. As the effects of the climate crisis worsen, environmental injustices will be exacerbated by the climate emergency–making the carceral state a site of intensifying climate crisis and environmental racism. Fighting both the carceral state and the climate crisis at the same time emboldens the fight against environmental racism.

Both the climate crisis and mass incarceration are systems of extraction, exploitation, and domination. Both are caused by anti-Black racism, anti-Indigeneity, dehumanization, and capitalism. And both overwhelmingly harm poor communities and communities of color. By addressing the climate crisis and mass incarceration together, movements for climate justice and abolition can reduce the vulnerability of people exposed to mass incarceration to the effects of the climate crisis in the short- and longer-terms.

MASS INCARCERATION AS AN UNNATURAL DISASTER IN LOUISIANA

At least 50,000 of Louisiana's residents are incarcerated, but this number does not reflect the constant cycling of people in and out of the carceral system. Each year, at least 86,000 different people are booked into local jails in Louisiana.[4] The majority of incarcerated people– about 50 percent– are held in Parish jails, which suggests overcrowding and/or lack of capacity in state prisons.[5] Around 7-8 percent of incarcerated people were held in private prisons from 2000-2015, after which the number dropped to zero.

Through Census and Homeland Infrastructure Foundation-Level Data (HFILD), this research identified at least 170 currently open carceral facilities in Louisiana, including 21 facilities run at the local level level, 123 at the county level, 16 at the state level, 8 at the federal level, and 3 multi-type facilities.[6] Of these facilities, capacity or reported beds remains mostly at the County level with 57 percent of beds being managed at the parish level, followed by the state with 28 percent of the beds. This amounts to over 73,000 beds across the state of Louisiana. These facilities sit on *well over* 27,000 acres of land, equivalent to over 20 City Parks in New Orleans. Most land that could be identified is managed at the state level, with the Louisiana State Penitentiary (also known as Angola Farm) occupying more than 18,000 acres of Tribal Houma territory.

In the state, people are incarcerated in facilities on former plantations, within 2500 square feet of Superfund and other toxic brownfield sites and refineries, and in the oncoming path of sea level rise.[7] When disasters hit, including Hurricane Katrina in 2005 to Ida in 2021, incarcerated people are left behind– or even forced to work to protect property from flooding and damage.[8] Meanwhile, courts block ailing incarcerated people from receiving help in sweltering heat waves that will only continue to intensify as the climate crisis worsens. **In Louisiana, spending on the carceral system instead of investment in social and environmental protections leaves frontline communities most exposed and with an inadequate share of resources required to weather the climate crisis.** This is why prisons are a key example of what activists and scholars refer to as "sacrifice zones."[9]

The term "unnatural disaster" refers to the presence or lack of social systems and structures that determine the impact of weather events like hurricanes, earthquakes, and wildfires on communities. Social factors like health, wealth, mobility, and marginalization make some communities, particularly working class communities of color, more vulnerable than wealthier and often whiter communities. Systems embedded at the intersection of racism, capitalism, austerity, and anti-indigeneity block access to protections from

4. "Louisiana Profile." Prison Policy Initative, 2019, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/LA.html.

5. Refer to discussion of "Why Beds?" in the "Caretaking Beds at Home" section and the methodology section of the appendix.

6. Refer to methodology section in the appendix.

7. Refer to Figure 1. See methodology for the map in the appendix.

8. Madison Pauly, "Detainees in Lafourche Filled Sandbags to Save Property. When the Town Evacuated, They Were Kept Jailed," Mother Jones, September 1, 2021, https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2021/09/detainees-ida-lafourche-sandbags-evacuation-louisiana/.

9. Sacrifice zones are described as "'communities or hotspots of chemical pollution where residents live immediately adjacent to heavily polluted industries or military bases." S. Lerner, *Sacrifice Zones: The Front Lines of Toxic Chemical Exposure in the United States* (MIT Press, 2010) https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/3300/Sacrifice-ZonesThe-Front-Lines-of-Toxic-Chemical.



Figure 1: Louisiana carceral facilities hazards map. Map of 125 carceral facilities out of the 170 facilities studied with an identified environmental justice issue (within a 2500' buffer from an environmental hazard). See the methodology section in the appendix for a discussion of making the map.



Figure 2: Louisiana carceral facilities floodplain map. At least 54 of the 170 facilities included are located in the FEMA National Flood Hazard Layer 100-year floodplain in Louisiana. Some researchers estimate the 100-year flood event could soon occur 1-30 years in the Gulf of Mexico in the face of the climate crisis. See methodology in the appendix for a discussion of the making of the map.

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10. Resa Marsooli, Ning Lin, Kenny Emanuel and Kairui Feng,"Climate change exacerbates hurricane flood hazards along US Atlantic and Gulf Coasts in spatially varying patterns," *Nature Communications* 10 (2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-11755-z.

extreme weather events. The carceral system is a social infrastructure that epitomizes the concept of unnatural disasters– exposing incarcerated people and their communities to the worst effects of the climate crisis.

Environmental injustices within the carceral system include the siting of carceral buildings on dangerous land, the use of people who are incarcerated in disaster recovery, and the persistence of hazardous conditions inside of carceral buildings such as lack of air conditioning or clean water. Extreme heat is one of the deadliest forms of climate-related weather, compounding underlying inequities, especially for people who cannot access air conditioning, with high overnight temperatures representing particular risks because they do not allow peoples' bodies to cool down. In Louisiana, sweltering summer heat in prisons already worsens health issues such as dehydration and heat stroke, while also harming the kidneys, liver, heart, brain, and lungs, potentially leading to renal failure, heart attack, and stroke. As the climate crisis fuels increasing and intensifying heat waves across the US south, this lack of air conditioning will only exacerbate harm and death for those incarcerated. Meanwhile, Louisiana is fighting necessary air conditioning adaptations to their infrastructure; in 2016, Louisiana spent more than $1 million on legal bills to fight installing air conditioning on death row at Louisiana State Penitentiary (Angola Farm), an amount estimated by one expert to be 4 times the cost of actually installing the air conditioning systems. In recent years, worker comfort and ICE detention contracts seem to be driving forces in propelling the state to consider using COVID-19 relief funds to install air conditioning in carceral facilities.

The climate crisis makes mass incarceration worse. Forced migration after disasters and away from regions experiencing early effects of the climate crisis like flooding and droughts, including, for example, droughts and crop failure in Central America, is expected to increase.[11] At the same time, the criminalization of migration has resulted in new contracts and funding for carceral organizations like Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

FORCED LABOR WITHIN THE CARCERAL SYSTEM

Two-thirds of people imprisoned in state and federal prisons in the US work during their imprisonment, according to an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) analysis of data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.[12] Roughly 80% of that work is prison maintenance labor, 8% public works assignments, 6.5% state-owned prison industries, 2% work-release programs, 2.2% agriculture, and 0.6% private industry.[13]

In Louisiana, publicly available data on prison labor is limited, and the state did not respond to the ACLU's Freedom of Information Act request for basic data.13 However, almost all of the roughly 5,000 people imprisoned at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (Angola Farm) work in the fields. Working conditions are abysmal; for example, solitary confinement is used to punish slow work. Angola Farm is a penal plantation. Across Louisiana, imprisoned workers make between $0.02 - $0.40 per hour, according to the ACLU. Over 600 imprisoned people work for the private sector in Louisiana, through contract transitional work programs, and another 1,000 imprisoned people work in non-contract transitional work programs.[14]

Historically, imprisoned people in Louisiana have been conscripted to work in industries that add to the climate crisis, as well as in response to disasters caused by the climate crisis. In 2019, for example, the Lafourche Parish Work Release facility assigned imprisoned people to work at 39 local companies, half of which served the oil and gas sector.[15] In 2005, people incarcerated in Orleans Parish Prison

11. "Dry Corridor Crisis (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua)," ReliefWeb World Food Programme, Oct 4, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/guatemala/dry-corridor-crisis-guatemala-el-salvador-honduras-nicaragua-september-2019.

12. "Captive Labor, Exploitation of Incarcerated Workers," ACLU and The Global Human Rights Clinic, 2022, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2022-06-15-captivelaborresearchreport.pdf.

13. "Captive Labor, Exploitation of Incarcerated Workers," ACLU and The Global Human Rights Clinic, 2022, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2022-06-15-captivelaborresearchreport.pdf.

14. M. Sainato,"Corporations are making millions of dollars from US prison labor," *Real News Network*, January 5, 2022, http://therealnews.com/corporations-are-making-millions-of-dollars-from-us-prison-labor; James M. Le Blanc, "Corrections Services Fact Sheet," Louisiana Department of Public Safety, 2020, https://s32082.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Demographics-Jul-20.pdf.

15. C. Berlin, "How Louisiana's oil and gas industry uses prison labor," *Scalawag*, March 24, 2020,. http://scalawagmagazine.org/2020/03/powerlines-prison-labor-oil/.

were conscripted to sandbag the facility during Hurricane Katrina—a facility that corrections officers later abandoned to floodwaters while hundreds of imprisoned people were locked in their cells.[16] In 2010, BP used imprisoned laborers to clean up its Deepwater Horizon oil spill.[17] In 2012, people incarcerated at Angola Farm worked to sandbag the facility when the Mississippi River threatened to flood.[18] As the climate crisis intensifies, so too will the domination and exploitation of incarcerated people. **This is a vicious and exploitative cycle in which forced penal labor is recruited into risky and environmentally damaging industries, only to be again forced into cleaning up the damage caused by those same industries.**

Forced prison labor and exploitative work release programs should be eliminated because they are incompatible with democracy and a just transition. Much like private for-profit prisons, these practices are to contemporary racial capitalism in the same way that chattel slavery and convict leasing were to early racial capitalism in the US. But like private prisons, these practices are rare relative to the scope and scale of mass incarceration in which the state is centrally involved, and should be situated within a broader abolitionist program. For example, the 600 incarcerated people working for contracted work release programs and the 1,000 incarcerated people working for non-contracted work release programs represent 2% and 4% of the Louisiana prison population, respectively.[19] Even if these practices were eliminated, enormous state investments of public resources to incarcerate, surveil, and supervise people in jails and prisons as well as the community would remain.

VISION FOR AN ABOLITION DEMOCRACY

Working towards police and prison abolition is a key climate intervention that will build community-level democracy and self-determination. The carceral system removes and isolates people from their communities and reinforces cycles of harm. The following interventions are possibly pathways to help us toward that vision. Instead of carceral systems and extractive economies, this report envisions safe and healthy communities where people are prepared for disasters and able to thrive and practice self-determination.

On the next page is a chart that includes a high-level overview of the interventions proposed in the playbook and puts them within the context of political and organizing capacity in the short, medium, and long term.

NATIONAL CONTEXT

Today, the United States incarcerates 1.9 million people in prisons, jails, juvenile corrections facilities, immigration detention facilities, Indian country jails, military prisons, civic commitment centers, and in prisons on US territories. It is an extreme global outlier, and incarcerates its citizens at a rate and number that is higher than any other country in the world.[20] Yet, researchers have established that incarceration does not deter criminalized behaviors and "cannot be justified on the grounds it affords public safety" by decreasing rearrest or reincarceration.

Within this extreme context, Louisiana's incarceration rates top all other states in the country.[21] In the

16. Gaillard JC, Navizet F. "Prisons, prisoners and disaster," Int J Disaster Risk Reduct 1(2012):33-43, https://doi:10.1016/j.ijdrr.2012.05.001; Human Rights Watch, "New Orleans: Prisoners Abandoned to Floodwaters," Human Rights Watch, September 21, 2005, https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/09/21/new-orleans-prisoners-abandoned-floodwaters.

17. AL Young, "BP Hires Prison Labor to Clean Up Spill While Coastal Residents Struggle," *The Nation*, July 21, 2010 https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/bp-hires-prison-labor-clean-spill-while-coastal-residents-struggle; M. Clarke, "Prisoner Labor Used to Clean Up BP Oil Spill," Prison Legal News, March 15, 2011, https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2011/mar/15/prisoner-labor-used-to-clean-up-bp-oil-spill/.

18. Brian Todd, "Prisoners pitch in to keep the mighty Mississippi River at bay," CNN, May 22, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/05/22/flooding/index.html.

19. Corrections Services, "Fact Sheet. Louisiana Department of Public Safety," 2020, https://s32082.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Demographics-Jul-20.pdf.

20. Peter Wagner, Josh Begley, and Leah Sakala, "States of Incarceration: The Global Context." States of Incarceration: The Global Context," Prison Policy Initiative, Accessed August 31, 2022, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global; Helen Fair and Ron Walmsley, "World Prison Population List," Institute for Crime and Justice Policy Research, January 12, 2021, https://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/world_prison_population_list_13th_edition.pdf.

21. Emily Widra and Tiana Herring, "States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2021," Prison Policy Initiative, September 2021, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2021.html.

Section	Subsection	Near Term	Medium Term	Long Term
Section 1: De-link FEMA and Post-Disaster Funding from Carceral Systems	**Fund hazard mitigation and prevention**	Increase FEMA's pre-disaster mitigation programs, the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC), and Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) grant programs.	Expand BRIC's non-financial Direct Technical Assistance (DTA) program to ensure lower-resourced communities receive support to apply for and use BRIC funds.	Fully fund a public disaster response workforce. Federally declare the climate crisis as a national emergency.
	Streamline recovery and make it accessible	Require that FEMA provide support and funding to communities for risk communication ahead of hazards.	Provide low-income households and unhoused people with stipends ahead of disasters.	
	End systemic discrimination, including funding to the police and prison systems	End requirement of IDs for disaster aid qualification and qualifications based on migration status.	End the enforcement of quality-of-life ordinances before, during, and after disasters. Require that jails, prisons, and incarcerated folks are adequately acknowledged in the comprehensive plans, hazard mitigation plans, emergency evacuation plans, and climate action plans of the jurisdictions they are sited in.	Amend legislation so FEMA funding cannot be used to rebuild public facilities such as jails and prisons in high-risk, hazardous locations.

Table 1. Part 1. High-Level Overview of Interventions in this Policy Playbook

Section	Subsection	Near Term	Medium Term	Long Term
Section 2: Care begins at home	**Divest from police and carceral systems**	Assess carceral infrastructure for all disaster-related vulnerabilities.	Bring together a campaign for a Green New Deal for K-12 Public Schools.	
	Invest in Green Community Infrastructure	Develop incentives to support private development of green infrastructure.	Implement stormwater management infrastructure on public lands. Establish publicly funded and managed coastal reclamation projects.	Build multifunctional green community infrastructure.

Table 1. Part 2. High-Level Overview of Interventions in this Policy Playbook

state, people are incarcerated in facilities on former plantations, next to superfund sites, within refineries, and in the oncoming path of sea level rise.[22] When disasters hit, incarcerated people are left behind–or even made to work.[23] Meanwhile, courts block ailing incarcerated people from receiving help in sweltering heat waves that will continue to intensify as the climate crisis worsens.[24] In Louisiana, cruelty and profit intertwine with unnatural disasters to create an ongoing disaster even larger, even more cruel.

22. Refer to maps in appendix.

21. "Prison Conditions and Prisoner Abuse After Katrina," American Civil Liberties Union, accessed April 24th, 2023, https://www.aclu.org/other/prison-conditions-and-prisoner-abuse-after-katrina.

24. Michael Kunzelman, "Court overturns heat-index limit on Louisiana's death row," AP News, February 1, 2018, https://apnews.com/article/450b922f73804d2b9d5726429677f525.

SECTION 1: De-link FEMA and Post-Disaster Funding from Carceral Systems

In the context of increasing frequency and intensity of disasters, there is a growing need for an effective and demilitarized coordinating body that establishes community engagement and directs benefits to all affected communities. Local and state governments like Louisiana's are cash-strapped, in need of tax reform, and face intractable state politics in the short term. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is an entity that can bring together campaigns for just disaster responses across movements— but its capacity to respond in just ways requires significant reforms. Louisianans need federally-supported pathways to support mitigation and adaptation pre-disasters and community-led recovery post-disaster– and there is ample opportunity to address these challenges by targeting FEMA.

In the past 70 years, the US federal government has gradually assumed more responsibility and authority over disaster response. Until 1947, the federal government largely intervened in disasters on an ad hoc basis if at all, preferring to limit its role to the provision of a "secure environment for business."[25] Congressional legislation in 1947 and 1950 established permanent federal relief funds and responsibility for disaster aid, and subsequent legislation expanded federal responsibility to include repair of local infrastructure and local government facilities after disasters.[26] Pressure continued to mount on the federal government to assume even more responsibility for delivering and coordinating disaster aid, culminating in the 1978 establishment of FEMA under the Carter administration.[27]

Since its inception, FEMA has had a dual mandate to manage both "natural" disasters and emergencies and "human-caused" disasters and emergencies across all stages of the disaster management cycle– including mitigation, protection, preparation, response, and recovery. Since 2003, the agency has been under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland

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25. Charles Perrow, "The Next Catastrophe," in *The Next Catastrophe* (Princeton University Press, 2011), 44, https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691150161/the-next-catastrophe.

26. David Moss, "Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy since 1803," in *The Financing of Catastrophe Risk* (University of Chicago Press, 1999), 314–16,https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/F/bo3615805.html.

27. David Moss, "Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy since 1803," in *The Financing of Catastrophe Risk* (University of Chicago Press, 1999), 314–16,https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/F/bo3615805.html.

Security, a placement that has emphasized "national security" aspects of the agency's mission over recent decades. This trajectory was driven by the political responses to the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, and most dramatically the institutional decisions made by the George W. Bush administration after the 9/11/2001 attacks, all of which pushed FEMA towards the "terrorism consequence management 'business'" and into the same institutional home as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).[28]

FEMA has a history of insufficient and ineffective responses to natural hazards. This is partly because much of FEMA's approach to managing disasters is reactionary– throwing funding at effects at response and recovery after events occur, often with inadequate organization and appropriate staff capacity, and neglecting the mitigation and protection aspects of the disaster management cycle.[29] The agency's poor disaster management can also be attributed to its capture by terrorism and national security focused elements in the federal government, to which FEMA now reports.

FEMA DOES NOT DEDICATE ENOUGH RESOURCES TO HAZARD MITIGATION AND PREVENTION.

A Presidential disaster declaration triggers the 1988 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) which allows the mobilization of funds by FEMA chiefly through the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). The main funding streams of the DRF are the Public Assistance Program (PA) which gives money to all levels of government for relief and repair following a disaster, the Individual Assistance (IA) program which provides funds to individuals and households that are uninsured or underinsured. Recently, the Stafford Act was amended to allow the President to set aside 6% of DRF funds for disaster mitigation, funds which are managed by the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) program.[30]

Despite the stated commitment to manage all stages of the disaster cycle, FEMA largely focuses on response and recovery even though it is well documented that hazard mitigation strategies such as retrofitting buildings and adopting model building codes are effective at saving lives and money. In fact, a study of federal hazard mitigation grants disseminated over 23 years showed that each dollar spent on hazard mitigation saved an average of 6 dollars in relief and recovery costs.[31] Yet, FEMA has historically underfunded mitigation and prevention activities in favor of reactionary recovery funding.[32] Hurricane Katrina provides a well-known, chilling example of FEMA's failure to mitigate against and prevent hazards. Despite the fact that FEMA itself had released a report in 2001 declaring a hurricane in New Orleans as one of the three likeliest disasters to confront the United States, the federal government not only failed to repair the dilapidated levees that protect the city from flooding but allowed unrestricted development of the wetlands that provide the city with flood protection.[33] In the years following Hurricane Katrina, of the estimated $76 billion FEMA spent on relief and recovery costs in Louisiana, only about $1.7 billion was spent on post-disaster mitigation grants.[34]

In some cases, FEMA exacerbates hazards. For example, the FEMA-administered National Flood

28. Richard Sylves and William R Cumming, "FEMA's Path to Homeland Security: 1979-2003," *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 1, no. 2 (2004): 1, 13, https://doi.org/10.2202/1547-7355.1023.

29. Charles Perrow, "The Next Catastrophe," in *The Next Catastrophe* (Princeton University Press, 2011),https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691150161/the-next-catastrophe.

30. "Stafford Act," FEMA, November 18, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/disaster/stafford-act.

31. K. Porter, N. Dash, C. Huyck, J. Santos, C. Scawthorn, M. Eguchi, R. Eguchi, S. Ghosh, M. Isteita, K. Mickey, T. Rashed, A. Reeder, P. Schneider, J. Yuan, A Cohen-Porter, "Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: 2019 Report" National Institute of Building Sciences, 2019, https://www.nibs.org/files/pdfs/NIBS_MMC_MitigationSaves_2019.pdf.

32. Charles Perrow, "Using Organizations: The Case of FEMA," *Items*, May 30, 2019, https://items.ssrc.org/understanding-katrina/using-organizations-the-case-of-fema/.

33. Angela Noel, "America's Own Backyard: Hurricane Katrina and Military Intervention," Emergency as Security 3 (2014): 75–76; Ambereen Siddiqui, Building an Abolitionist Understanding of Disaster Risk Reduction (University of California, Irvine, 2021).

34. Louise K. Comfort, Thomas A. Birkland, Beverly A. Cigler, and WEarthea Nance, "Retrospectives and Prospectives on Hurricane Katrina: Five Years and Counting." Public Administration Review 70, no. 5,(2010): 669–78, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40802363.

Insurance Program (NFIP) and its subsidiary, the Community Rating System (CRS), have often been accused of encouraging development in hazardous areas by subsidizing flood insurance rates to businesses and households in eligible communities. Critics argue the subsidized flood insurance rates mask the risk of existing in areas susceptible to flooding. Also, a study on NFIP claims between 1998 and 2008 showed that the wealthiest counties in the nation filed 3.5 times more claims and received $1 billion more than poorer counties.[35]

Another highly relevant example of FEMA not mitigating hazards is the rebuilding of the Plaquemines Parish Detention Center. Destroyed by Katrina, the detention center was rebuilt at a price tag of $105 million on the same flood-prone land, largely using FEMA's Public Assistance program funds. While the new jail is elevated higher than it was prior to Katrina, if a storm identical to Katrina hit it again, it might still be at risk of flooding.[36] This story is not unique, as FEMA cannot mandate the relocation of structures, even public facilities; it can only require that they meet existing codes.

FEMA'S RECOVERY EFFORTS ARE POORLY ORGANIZED AND PIECEMEAL.

Even though FEMA spends exorbitant amounts of money on recovery, it is remarkably inefficient at helping communities recover from disasters. Many people do not receive the funding they need to recover from disasters. For example, one study reported that at least 50% of a sample of 12,000 cases that were denied Individual Assistance (IA) by FEMA should have been eligible for assistance– in other words, 12,000 cases were unjustly denied FEMA assistance.[37] Also, most FEMA funding is only available to US citizens and certain qualified residents, leaving many refugees, undocumented immigrants, and certain visa holders ineligible for receiving compensation. **The opaque methods through which FEMA determines who qualifies for assistance under IA make receiving aid and appealing denials time-consuming and difficult for persons already dealing with the financial and psychological difficulties of surviving disasters.** Also, many expenses are not covered by FEMA, such as buying food and supplies for emergency kits and the costs of evacuating, even in cases when a mandatory evacuation order is issued.

Again, Katrina is a prime example of FEMA's failures. Despite the influx of millions of dollars from around the world to NGOs that mobilized after Hurricane Katrina, these organizations found "no effective coordinating structure" present to coordinate a humanitarian response.[38] The one response that was well organized was the militarized one: local police forces, the Louisiana National Guard, private military companies including Blackwater, white vigilante militias, and even Israeli Defense Forces troops mobilized to implement "crime prevention."[39] Though future disasters may see more post-disaster mitigation funding dollars as under the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018, the President is now allowed to earmark up to only six percent of FEMA's disaster relief fund for hazard mitigation for public infrastructure– an insufficient proportion of funding to address the scale of the climate crisis.

This haphazard, "militarized aid" approach does not afford people the security required to rebuild their lives post-disaster, and leads to increased instability and criminalization. It reflects a government aimed at protecting property from people rather than protecting people from disaster. As climate disasters displace more people more frequently, the government is ill-prepared to help them all, leaving thousands of people stranded in temporary housing for years and in situations that do not facilitate equitable recovery.

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35. J. Scott Holladay, and Jason A. Schwartz, "Flooding the market," New York University School of Law Policy Brief 7 (2010).

36. Kevin Sack and John Schwartz, "As Storms Keep Coming, FEMA Spends Billions in 'Cycle' of Damage and Repair," *New York Times*, October 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/fema-disaster-recovery-climate-change.html.

37. P.G.Rando, "Mitigating the Discretion Disaster: How Changes in the Law Can Help FEMA Effectuate Its Critical Mission," *U. Cin. L. Rev.* 90, (2021) 1265, https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss4/7/.

38. Angela M Eikenberry, Verónica Arroyave, and Tracy Cooper, "Administrative Failure and the International NGO Response to Hurricane Katrina," *Public Administration Review* 67 (2007): 165–66, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00825.x.

39. Angela Noel, "America's Own Backyard: Hurricane Katrina and Military Intervention," *Emergency as Security* 3 (2014): 75–76.

FEMA FUNDS POLICE AND PRISONS.

Under the guise of the need for public safety during and following disasters, exorbitant amounts of funds are provided by FEMA to police departments and prisons. In the aftermath of disasters, police unnecessarily criminalizes survivors who may steal to meet their basic needs following disasters. This funnels often poor people into the incarceration system which FEMA also funds. In just six years following Katrina, FEMA boasted of completing work on 254 public safety facilities and starting construction on an additional 39 of these facilities, likely police stations, prisons and jails. At that point, this work cost FEMA a hefty $842.2 million. Similarly, following Hurricane Maria, $45M in FEMA aid post-disaster was earmarked for police department facilities.[40] Even outside of an abolitionist framework, these expenditures are often needlessly large. For example, the previously discussed Plaquemines Parish Detention Center was rebuilt at its pre-storm capacity despite the fact that even prior to Katrina it could not fill even half of its 800 beds. Elevating the new structure cost an estimated 35%-40% more to construction costs than if it were built outside of the floodplain.[41]

FEMA POLICY HAS DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BLACK PEOPLE.

Until recently, FEMA policy required that in order to receive Individual Assistance (IA), applicants had to prove they were in possession of the property title. Black victims of natural disasters may be unable to demonstrate clear title to property they have inherited or currently own, resulting in unjustly being ruled ineligible for disaster assistance. According to reporting from the Washington Post, "more than a third of Black-owned land in the South is passed down informally, rather than through deeds and wills… When land is handed down like this, it becomes heirs' property, a form of ownership in which families hold property collectively, without clear title."[42] This makes it harder to apply for FEMA individual assistance after disasters, as homeowners unable to prove a clear title of property are often denied available economic relief.

USDA found that Post-Katrina, 20,000 heirs' property owners were denied federal aid in affected regions. The number of exclusions from federal aid in Puerto Rico post-Maria were even higher, where 80,000 applications were denied because of title problems despite there being no legal basis for requiring survivors to provide specific proof of homeownership. Under pressure, FEMA instituted a self-certification process for survivors of Hurricane Maria in 2018 to resolve the crisis. Initially, this self-certification process only applied to island and tribal areas, but in September 2021, it was expanded to the entire nation.[43] It is yet to be seen if this policy will be applied fairly and equitably, but it does not correct decades of discrimination against Black property owners, which likely contributed to generations of poverty and wealth inequality.

These policies and institutional gaps by FEMA and other government organizations make it likely that future disasters will, like recent ones, exacerbate existing injustices and inequalities around housing and the criminal justice system. Housing is understood to be highly important to successful re-entry for people who have been incarcerated, with effects that run from helping with employment stability, to accessing social services, to maintaining one's individual and community life.[44] Formerly incarcerated people are almost 10 times more likely to be unhoused than the general public, with higher rates among people who have been incarcerated more than once or were recently released.[45] Moreover, the US housing system in general uses policing alongside credit and other forms of surveillance to shift the

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40. FEMA, "FEMA Allocates $45 Million for Police Facilities," press release, February 8, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20210218/fema-allocates-45-million-police-facilities.

41. Kevin Sack and John Schwartz, "As Storms Keep Coming, FEMA Spends Billions in 'Cycle' of Damage and Repair," *New York Times*, October 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/fema-disaster-recovery-climate-change.html.

42. Hannah Dreier and Andrew Ba Tran, "'The real damage': Why FEMA is denying disaster aid to Black families that have lived for generations in the Deep South," *Washington Post*, July 11, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/07/11/fema-black-owned-property/.

43. FEMA, "FEMA Makes Changes to Individual Assistance Policies to Advance Equity for Disaster Survivors," press release, September 2, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20210902/fema-makes-changes-individual-assistance-policies-advance-equity-disaster.

44. Amanda Geller, and Marah A. Curtis, "A Sort of Homecoming: Incarceration and the Housing Security of Urban Men," *Social Science Research* 40, no.4 , March 26, 2011, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0049089X11000585.

45. Lucius Couloute, "Nowhere to Go: Homelessness among Formerly Incarcerated People," Prison Policy Initiative, accessed August 18, 2022, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/housing.html.

risks of housing down from landlords to tenants: importantly including the risk of eviction, which creates homelessness.[46] This perverse distribution of protection and risk shows up after disasters– in some cases, homeless people have reported being actively excluded from disaster relief shelters with the aid of police officers.[47] Even when housing is provided after disasters, the quality of housing can still retrench injustices: Post-Katrina, people who were unhoused by the hurricane were placed in trailers with dangerously high formaldehyde levels that still remained in-use as housing a decade later. In July 2022, more than 4,000 Louisiana households displaced by Hurricane Ida remained in FEMA housing.[48]

LOUISIANA COMMUNITIES ARE FIGHTING BACK

Community organizations have not left disaster response to the local, state, or federal government, and have fought to challenge inequities and build power: what researcher Rachel E. Luft terms "crisis organizing."[49] The movement response to Hurricane Katrina shows a wealth of examples. Some of the work done in response to the crisis connected with longstanding organizations like The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), and others out of the initiative of people with organizing experience, like the former Black Panther and Green Party member Malik Rahim's Common Ground Collective. These organizations mobilized tens of thousands of activists and volunteers to distribute supplies and gut destroyed houses.

Organizations like the People's Hurricane Relief Fund and People's Organizing Committee even founded "Survivor Councils" for low income, Black, displaced New Orleanians - people often underrepresented or entirely absent in many of the formal institutions dedicated to recovery efforts. These councils worked on a bottom-up basis, aiming at self-determination and accountability for those on the councils as well as those taking political direction from their directives.[50] Even FEMA trailer parks and hotels contracted by FEMA to host people displaced by the climate-intensified hurricane became organizing spaces for groups like the New Orleans Workers' Center for Racial Justice, which organizes for "first-class citizenship" for working-class people of color.[51] These organizations did not stop with the immediate aftermath of Katrina, but add to whole generations of movement organizations in the Gulf South, many of which continue to fight for justice until today.[52]

This frontline-led response to the high profile disaster of Hurricane Katrina is not unique. The motto of the Common Ground Collective, "Solidarity Not Charity," is a well known and fundamental ethos to mutual aid.[53] This ethos was on display in the well publicized, vast spread of mutual aid networks in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.[54] Some of these have been

46. Matthew Desmond and Nathan Wilmers, "Do the Poor Pay More for Housing? Exploitation, Profit, and Risk in Rental Markets," *American Journal of Sociology* 124, no. 4 (2019): 1090–1124, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/701697; Abigail Higgins and Olúfemi O. Táíwò, "Enforcing Eviction," *The Nation*, August 19, 2020, https://www.thenation.com/article/society/police-eviction-housing/.

47. Jamie Vickery, "Using an Intersectional Approach to Advance Understanding of Homeless Persons' Vulnerability to Disaster," *Environmental Sociology* 4, no. 1 (2018): 136–47,https://doi.org/10.1080/23251042.2017.1408549.

48. "People Are Still Living in FEMA's Toxic Katrina Trailers -- and They Likely Have No Idea," *Grist*, accessed August 18, 2022, https://grist.org/politics/people-are-still-living-in-femas-toxic-katrina-trailers-and-they-likely-have-no-idea/.

49. Rachel E Luft, "Beyond Disaster Exceptionalism: Social Movement Developments in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina," *American Quarterly* 61, no. 3 (2009): 499–527.

50. Rachel E Luft, "Beyond Disaster Exceptionalism: Social Movement Developments in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina," *American Quarterly* 61, no. 3 (2009): 499–527.

51. Saket Soni, "Transforming Democracy: African Americans and Latinos' Fight for First-Class Citizenship in the South," *Latino Studies* 10, no. 1 (2012): 11–17, https://doi.org/10.1057/lst.2012.3.

52. Caroline Keegan, "'Black Workers Matter': Black Labor Geographies and Uneven Redevelopment in Post-Katrina New Orleans," *Urban Geography* 42, no. 3 (2021): 340–59, https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2020.1712121.

53. Dean Spade, "Solidarity Not Charity: Mutual Aid for Mobilization and Survival," *Social Text* 38, no. 1 (2020): 131–51, https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-7971139.

54. Maria Fernandes-Jesus et al., "More than a COVID-19 Response: Sustaining Mutual Aid Groups during and beyond the Pandemic," Frontiers in Psychology, 2021, 4809, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.716202; Dorothy Hastings, "'Abandoned by Everyone Else,' Neighbors Are Banding Together during the Pandemic," PBS NewsHour, April 5, 2021, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/how-mutual-aid-networks-came-together-in-a-year-of-crisis; Ella Fassler, "Mutual Aid Groups That Arose During COVID Gather to Build Power Regionally," Truthout, accessed August 19, 2022, https://truthout.org/articles/mutual-aid-groups-that-arose-during-covid-gather-to-build-power-regionally/.

durable beyond the initial waves of the pandemic: multiple gatherings in 2022 convened hundreds of participants from mutual aid groups across the country, sharing ideas and resources for long term mutual aid organizing.[55] One such organization, the Woodbine mutual aid hub in Queens, had expanded to a larger physical location from their small start in 2020 and was holding regular group exercise sessions, dinners, and large scale social events well into 2022.[56]

Louisiana has a long history of environmental justice organizing victories more broadly, from the unprecedented delays in developing the Formosa Plastics plant to the cancellation of the Nucor Steel expansion and Tallgrass oil terminals. In 2014, the Juvenile Justice Project led organizing to reduce bed space in Tallulah from a capacity of 2,000 to 350 beds.[57] After a massive campaign to shrink the New Orleans city jail, which flooded and needed to be decommissioned, the bed number eventually shrunk despite being rebuilt. Statewide, organizations like Voice of the Experienced and Black Voters Matter have built a voting rights strategy that bridges urban-rural divides.

Together, all of these examples show another model of crisis response: one rooted in protecting communities with provisions rather than policing.

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55. Ella Fassler, "Mutual Aid Groups That Arose During COVID Gather to Build Power Regionally," Truthout, accessed August 19, 2022, https://truthout.org/articles/mutual-aid-groups-that-arose-during-covid-gather-to-build-power-regionally/.

56. Ella Fassler, "Mutual Aid Groups That Arose During COVID Gather to Build Power Regionally," Truthout, accessed August 19, 2022, https://truthout.org/articles/mutual-aid-groups-that-arose-during-covid-gather-to-build-power-regionally/.

57. Della Hasselle, "A Decade after Reforms Ordered, Critics Point to Problems in Juvenile-Justice System," The Lens, November 7, 2019, https://thelensnola.org/2014/10/06/a-decade-after-louisiana-reformed-its-juvenile-justice-system-critics-point-to-problems/.

SUMMARY OF POLICIES

FEMA and the Biden administration are starting to acknowledge the need for equitable post-disaster recovery funding, including through the Disaster Assistance Supportive Housing Program, which was formed under pressure to reform its transitional housing programs post-disaster through the new 2022 FEMA and HUD partnership. Some FEMA programs are also covered under the Justice40 Initiative, aiming to channel 40% of available funding to disadvantaged communities. But this is not enough. Policy initiatives that should be implemented include the following:

BAN GAS AND OIL EXPORTS

Increase the budget of FEMA's pre-disaster mitigation programs, the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC), and Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) grant programs. For the fiscal year 2021, FEMA made $1.16 billion available for both programs combined but received applications for close to $4.7 billion from states, territories and tribes.[58] While $1.16 billion is more than double the budget allocated to BRIC in the previous year, it clearly falls short of the mitigation needs of communities.

Expand BRIC's non-financial Direct Technical Assistance (DTA) program to ensure lower-resourced communities receive support to apply for and use BRIC funds. In 2021, BRIC only provided DTA to 20 of the more than 100 communities that applied for support.[59] Even this non-financial assistance, which takes the form of holistic planning support, can increase communities' abilities to mitigate against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from hazards. It is essential that FEMA provides support to all eligible communities.

End the enforcement of quality-of-life ordinances before, during, and after disasters. This includes arresting, fining, and jailing unhoused people for acts related to their survival. These practices are not only cruel, they funnel people back into the "revolving door" of the carceral system.

Require that FEMA provide support and funding to communities for risk communication ahead of hazards, including support translating communications into relevant languages. All communications about program updates and information should be made accessible in multiple relevant languages and over multiple platforms.

Provide low-income households and unhoused people with stipends ahead of disasters. The stipends should be enough to cover the costs of supplies, such as food and emergency kits, as well as the costs of transport and lodging when evacuation is suggested or necessary. Transportation options should also be provided for households without access to a vehicle.

Require that jails, prisons, and incarcerated folks are adequately acknowledged in the comprehensive plans, hazard mitigation plans, emergency evacuation plans, and climate action plans of the jurisdictions they are sited in. Community plans rarely mention the prisons and jails located within their jurisdictions, leaving evacuation and emergency planning for incarcerated folks under the purview of prison officials.[60] This has often resulted in a lack of planning for the safety and wellbeing of incarcerated folks during disasters which exacerbates their already heightened vulnerability and exposure to hazards, or at best, the existence of opaque plans which are not available for public scrutiny. Evacuation and other disaster plans for prisons should be publicly available documents and should not be created by persons and institutions that are directly invested in the dehumanization of incarcerated people.

Amend legislation so FEMA funding cannot be used to rebuild public facilities such as jails and prisons in high-risk, hazardous locations. Risk analysis should be conducted using the most recent and advanced technology available and should take into account likely climate crisis scenarios.

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58. FEMA, "Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities FY 2021 Subapplication and Selection Status," Accessed September 1, 2022, https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/building-resilient-infrastructure-communities/after-apply/fy-2021-subapplication-status.

59. FEMA, "BRIC Direct Technical Assistance," Accessed September 1, 2022, https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/building-resilient-infrastructure-communities/direct-technical-assistance.

60. Carlee J. Purdum, "Hazardous or vulnerable? Prisoners and emergency planning in the US," *Emerging voices in natural hazards research*, Butterworth-Heinemann (2019): 179-209, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-815821-0.00014-X.

SUMMARY OF POLICIES

End requirement of IDs for disaster aid qualification and qualifications based on migration status. Disaster aid through FEMA only covers "qualified immigrants"– a narrow group that includes green card holders and some refugees and asylum seekers. Undocumented immigrants and people on guest worker visas do not qualify. Meanwhile, trust in FEMA in immigrant communities is low; the Department of Homeland Security which houses FEMA also houses ICE, and FEMA has not made clear assurances that they will not share information with ICE from its involvement in Hurricane Katrina in 2005 to Hurricane Ida in 2021. What is clear is that life matters regardless of immigration status and that people of all citizenship backgrounds deserve to survive and thrive after disaster. All disaster aid, from FEMA to mutual aid, should be uncoupled from citizenship status, including documentation and IDs. The first step towards ending ID requirements could be ensuring all existing mutual aid networks coordinate accessibility for all, regardless of IDs or citizenship status.

Federally declare the climate crisis as a national emergency. Under the Stafford Act, this would allow FEMA to rapidly manufacture and deploy the build-out of climate resilient energy systems and other mitigation and adaptation measures to communities on the frontlines of the climate crisis.

Fully fund a public disaster response workforce. Disaster response workers are critical workers. It is unacceptable that incarcerated people be forced into this labor. The state should fully fund a workforce that is trained, equipped, and compensated for the essential work they do.

SECTION 2: Care Begins at Home

Disaster often makes home an unsafe place to be. Sweltering heat; lack of electricity; rising waters; lack of safe drinking water; failing roofs, windows, or doors can make a home an unsafe place to shelter and survive. When the prison industrial complex invests in beds in incarceration, it diverts public money away from communities– the places where people make decisions about how to survive a disaster, whether those are houses, apartments, encampments or elsewhere. The carceral system also divests money from providing the physical infrastructure required for those emergency plans to be carried out safely. Housing segregation, incarceration, education injustice including the school-to-prison pipeline, and climate injustices are interconnected issues exacerbated during crises. Instead, the carceral system prioritizes warehousing people away from work, community, and wellness. In effect, every bed the state of Louisiana builds in carceral infrastructure is resources taken away from empowering communities. Beyond the economic drain, carceral infrastructure also steals years of life from the people in those carceral beds.[61]

WHY BEDS?

In Louisiana, it is not a matter of how many carceral buildings there are, but how many beds can be filled in those buildings. This is because parish-managed beds in Louisiana may contain people incarcerated at any level (parish, state, ICE), despite what people the building was built to incarcerate. In Louisiana, 56.7% of about 73,000 beds are held at the parish level.[62] This report estimates 3 out of 4 people incarcerated in Louisiana are actually incarcerated at the parish level–despite their official placement in the carceral system.[63] This is because, starting in 1992,[64] a jail-building boom at the parish level drastically increased the number of beds that parishes now

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61. Prison Policy Initiative reports that "Each year in prison takes 2 years off an individual's life expectancy." See here: Emily Widra, "Incarceration shortens life expectancy," Prison Policy Initiative, June 26, 2017, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/06/26/life_expectancy/.

62. Refer to appendix for methodology

63. Refer to appendix for methodology

64. Joshua Aiken, "Era of Mass Expansion: Why State Officials Should Fight Jail Growth," Prison Policy Initative, May 31, 2017, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/jailsovertime.html#renting; Courtney Harper Turkington, "Louisiana's Addiction to Mass Incarceration by the Numbers," *Loyola Law Review* 63 (557) (2017), https://dspace.loyno.edu/xmlui/handle/123456789/93.

contract out for use by the state for a per diem per person ($24.39),[65] as well as ICE for an even higher per diem per person (~$65).[66] This phenomenon of incentivizing funding through the construction of bedspace is continued today in the trend of filling beds emptied by recent carceral reforms[67] with ICE-contracted incarcerated individuals.[68]

Therefore, this report estimates it is the increase in beds that makes mass incarceration in Louisiana grow–and it is through removing beds that it may shrink. Any action that causes beds to be forever closed or never built is a win for democracy. This includes ending solitary confinement, decreasing bedspace at every level, organizing against new carceral infrastructure or redevelopment of existing carceral infrastructure, and ending per diem payments.

CARCERAL BEDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE

Disaster strikes communities–including people in carceral facilities. **Because incarceration is a disaster of environmental racism, it is clear that environmental disaster only compounds the issue.** This is because carceral infrastructure (jails, prisons, correctional centers, and the roads, electric lines, and pipes that service them) are often located in otherwise undesirable locations for development–and often that means disaster-vulnerable locations or sacrifice zones (refer to Figure 1). A review of physical conditions of carceral infrastructure and disaster resilience, Glade et al (2022), also found papers suggesting correlation between Superfund and brownfield sites and carceral infrastructure as well as air pollution.[69] Our analysis (Figure 1) of several types of hazard data (see appendix for a list of all data used) suggests that almost 3 out of 4 carceral facilities in Louisiana are within a 2500' buffer of an environmental hazard including Superfund sites, potential PFAS pollution areas, oil and gas wells, pipelines, and sea level rise– many are in the buffer of multiple hazards. Almost 1 out of 3 are in FEMA's effective or preliminary 100 year floodplain (Figure 2).

Lived experiences of people in Louisiana who are trapped in the disasters within the disaster clearly shows this connection. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina stranded incarcerated people in Orleans Parish Prison for days without food, water, or electricity.[70] In 2016, Louisiana's only prison for women was closed due to flooding around Baton Rouge.[71] In 2020, Hurricane Laura left ICE facilities without water or electricity depriving the people detained, including asylum seekers, of air conditioning and working bathrooms.[72] As the climate crisis worsens disasters and increases their frequency, these carceral facilities and the beds within them will become only more cruel and dangerous, leading to premature death of incarcerated people. **To release people from the disaster within the disaster, all environmentally vulnerable carceral facilities must be closed–and when a disaster strikes them, they must not be rebuilt or reopened.** This requires a state-wide study of carceral infrastructure and its vulnerability, especially in the context of climate-exacerbated disasters.

65. Richard Rainy, "Should they stay or should they go? The case of state inmates in New Orleans jail," *NOLA.com*, September 23, 2015, https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article_eb700a7b-08ca-5170-84df-f49319fb99d7.html.

66. Bryn Stole, "As fewer inmates fill Louisiana jails, wardens turn to immigration officials to fill bunks, budgets," *NOLA.com*, May 9, 2019, https://www.nola.com/news/article_0b819a1f-d24b-5107-bbdd-7b29af9a3c3f.html.

67. The Pew Charitable Trusts, "Louisiana's 2017 Criminal Justice Reforms," March 1, 2018, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/03/louisianas-2017-criminal-justice-reforms.

68. Incarceration Transparency, "Louisiana Death Behind Bars 2015-2019," 2021, https://www.incarcerationtransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/LA-Death-Behind-Bars-Report-Final-June-2021.pdf.

69. Sara Glade, Skye Niles, Shawhin Roudbari, Phaedra C. Pezzullo, Shideh Dashti, Abbie B. Liel, and Shelly L. Miller, "Disaster resilience and sustainability of incarceration infrastructures: A review of the literature," *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction* 80(1) (October 2022), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2022.103190.

70. ACLU National Prison Project, "Abandoned and Abused," ACLU National Prison Project, August 10, 2006, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/oppreport20060809.pdf.

71. Jacqueline DeRobertis and Gordon Russell, "Six Years After Flood, Louisiana May Finally Build a New Women's Prison," *The Advocate*, June 20, 2022, https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_b30f394c-edb8-11ec-9802-6fc55065036e.html.

72. Noah Lanard, "Detainees Describe Dire Conditions After the Hurricane Left ICE Jails Without Water or Power," MotherJones, September 1, 2020, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/09/detainees-describe-dire-conditions-after-hurricane-leaves-ice-jails-without-water-or-power/.

DISASTER FILLS CARCERAL BEDS

Considering that incarceration increases vulnerability to disaster and that reopening carceral facilities after disasters is a sunk cost into an unjust system, it is triply insidious that disaster is also used to fill beds in incarceration through money bail (often called cash bail), fines, and fees. First, surviving a disaster can be criminalized to fill beds. People are levied with massive bails for "looting" after disasters. Post-disaster bail in Louisiana has included: $50,000 and $60,000 bails for "looting" small items after Hurricane Katrina[73] and $1 million bails for "looters" after Hurricane Ida in Terrebonne Parish.[74] Research from the Vera Institute for Justice showed that New Orleanians pay nearly $9 million per year into the money bail system, which funds the so-called justice system–excluding fines and fees for minor municipal and traffic offenses.[75] This represents millions of dollars that could instead be re-invested in communities. People who are unable to pay bail are pushed back into harmful and unnecessary cycles of incarceration, with poor and low-income Black people affected the most. Research on a program that eliminated money bail for qualifying low-level cases in Kentucky showed that reducing the rate of money bail can directly increase rates of pretrial release– indicating that even much less financially burdensome bail amounts than those seen post-disaster in Louisiana can result in people staying incarcerated pretrial.[76]

The bail system is not disaster adapted. In New Orleans, families and advocates must deliver bail in-person. When hurricanes hit, even mild ones, the courts send workers home, so families and advocates with bail in hand for jailed individuals are left without an outlet to get them out.[77] Jailed individuals are then subject to disaster in jail. In 2005, two tourists arrested before Hurricane Katrina spent weeks in Louisiana State Penitentiary despite being falsely imprisoned.[78] Massive bails and non-resilient bail practices mean people are entered into incarceration because of disasters–filling doubly-disastrous carceral beds when they could be safe elsewhere. **To stop people from entering carceral infrastructure during and after disaster, Louisiana must end money bail.** Money bail keeps people incarcerated who are not convicted of a crime and it also criminalizes people post-disaster for surviving. Ending money bail allows people to remain home where they can rebuild, support their neighbors, and thrive in community.

Second, fines and fees hamper individuals from thriving during and after disaster– and not paying them can lead to future incarceration. 80% of formerly incarcerated people earn less than $15,000 per year.[79] In Louisiana, many people on parole owe thousands of dollars via fines and fees for their incarceration. This debt accrues interest.[80] Fines and fees cut into a formerly incarcerated person's ability to survive disaster–and to thrive afterward, especially when combined with the economic costs of the intensifying climate crisis. For example, high energy burden, an outsized portion of their income spent on home energy bills, already saddles Louisiana households with financial hardship despite Louisiana having some of the lowest energy rates in the US. In 2017, a report found that half of New Orleans households paid an energy burden of 9.8% while a quarter of New Orleans households paid 18.9%. The national average

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73. Farah Chalisa, "Summary of Criminal Justice in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina," Accessed April 28th, 2022, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/crsj/webinar/summary-of-criminal-justice-in-new-orleans-after-hurricane-katrina.pdf.

74. John Bacon, "What we know about Ida aftermath: 2 million in Louisiana without power amid stifling heat and supply shortages," *USA Today*, September 21, 2021, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/09/01/hurricane-ida-aftermath-millions-louisiana-still-without-power/5678259001/.

75. Laisne, Mathilde, Jon Wool, and Christian Henrichson,"Past Due," Vera Institute of Justice, https://www.vera.org/publications/past-due-costs-consequences-charging-for-justice-new-orleans.

76. Alex Albright, "No Money Bail, No Problems? Trade-offs in a Pretrial Automatic Release Program." SocArXiv (July 2022), https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/42pbz/.

77. Matt Sledge, "Minor Storm exposed flaws in how New Orleans Courts Would Handle Bail in a Hurricane, Defenders Say," *The Times-Picayune*, July 17, 2019, https://www.nola.com/news/courts/article_cc0a4684-a8cf-11e9-9dbb-db10cf226739.html.

78. CBS News, "Katrina Jail Lawsuit: Jury Awards Tourists 650k," Accessed May 22, 2022,https://www.cbsnews.com/news/katrina-jail-lawsuit-jury-awards-tourists-650k/.

79. Brittany Dietch, "Rehabilitation or Revolving Door: How Parole is a Trap for Those in Poverty," *Georgetown Law Jounal Online* (2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4083274.

80. State of Louisiana, "Louisiana Justice Reinvestment Task Force Report and Recommendations," March 16, 2017, https://www.vote-nola.org/uploads/6/4/9/8/64988423/justice-reinvestment-task-force-report_2018.pdf.

is 3.5%. This is all despite Louisiana's relatively low cost of energy.[81] If a formerly incarcerated person in New Orleans makes less than $15,000 a year, up to $2,835 could go to energy burden instead of fines and fees, transportation, food, water, housing, childcare–or money to survive or evacuate a disaster.[82] Climate crisis will only *exacerbate the energy burden*. Because intensifying energy burden due to heat disasters can crush people with financial strain, people might choose to NOT pay fines and fees so that they may live daily life–threatening them with mounting interest and potential re-incarceration. **Ending fines and fees would put money back into the hands of community members by ending carceral fines and fees so that when the next disaster comes, they can survive and thrive.**

NO NEW BEDS

This report has laid out how disaster becomes an environmentally-unjust feedback mechanism for entrenching criminalization and the sunk cost of placing community members into the beds of racist mass incarceration. **But beyond not reopening vulnerable facilities–the state must not build new facilities either. Shiny, new, seemingly less vulnerable carceral infrastructure are still disasters that perpetuate environmental racism.** Every dollar spent on building new carceral beds– no matter how sensitively constructed– takes away funding that could go to making sure people thrive together in the face of environmental disasters in their home communities. Once again, building new carceral infrastructure represents sunk cost into a system that already harms communities, particularly Black, Indigenous, and person of color communities.

BUILD BACK NEVER

It is important to note that facilities impacted or damaged by disasters must not be reopened. Reopening these facilities represents an extensive cost to the public and a divestment of funds that could be invested in community well-being. In 2022, the proposal to rebuild Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women ballooned over $100 million to $138 million.[83] That is $138 million that could instead be spent on communities and their safety, survival, and daily needs. **Vulnerable carceral facilities must be closed before they can harm incarcerated people and workers–and they must never be built back after disaster.** Sinking more money into racist, environmentally dangerous, and disaster-vulnerable infrastructure amounts to more sunk cost in the unjust system of mass incarceration.

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81. American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, "How energy efficiency can help low-income households in Louisiana," October 9, 2017, https://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/pdf/fact-sheet/ses-louisiana-100917.pdf.

82. Brittany Dietch, "Rehabilitation or Revolving Door: How Parole is a Trap for Those in Poverty," *Georgetown Law Jounal Online* (2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4083274.

83. $44 million will be covered by FEMA–the rest by taxpayers. Jacqueline DeRobertis and Gordon Russell, "Six Years After Flood, Louisiana May Finally Build a New Women's Prison," *The Advocate*, June 20, 2022, https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_b30f394c-edb8-11ec-9802-6fc55065036e.html.

SUMMARY OF POLICIES

What policies can be resourced if the state is no longer pouring money into the disaster of mass incarceration? We propose the idea of Care Begins at Home–the assertion that beds where people already are, wherever they may be and call home, are the best places to make decisions about how to weather the disaster. The concept of "care begins at home" also stresses the interlinked nature of the housing, climate, and carceral crises. Below follow a set of policies to aid people in making decisions about where they survive and thrive in the face of disaster.

Stop Paying Parishes to Fill Beds. End per diem contracts from the state and from ICE. Rebalance parish funding so they do not need to seek further incarceration. If disaster does strike working carceral facilities, do not sink public money into reopening what has proven to be dangerous and harmful. The climate justice movement should partner with existing anti-carceral advocacy to demand the closure of harmful facilities and update existing infrastructure to expand carceral capacities.

Deeply Assess and Share Vulnerability Directly with Communities. Under and intensifying climate crisis, flood insurance maps are constantly changing. For example, the National Flood Insurance Program, which mainly provides flood insurance to property owners, are based on maps that evaluate flood risk. It currently narrowly focuses on homeowners. The NFIP should be transformatively scaled into a larger, more ambitious program that allows for coordinated managed retreat for people in extremely high risk places by transferring risk from individual households to the state. Furthermore, a renewed study across Louisiana of current and future vulnerability to climate crisis induced disasters, particularly flooding, is necessary. That information should be shared with communities directly, clearly, and to be kept publicly available. Every household deserves the most rigorous and comprehensive assessment of their risk under intensifying climate crises so people can make fully informed decisions about where and how they live and survive.

Support Healthy and Safe Evacuations. Home is where people make the decision on how to best survive. That may sometimes mean leaving the site of a house or settlement to seek shelter elsewhere. To fully empower people's decisions to stay or go, climate and community groups should establish standards for clear and plain language disaster risk to be communicated with community members. The coalition should establish best practices for dissemination. Furthermore, the infrastructure must exist for people to seek healthy and safe shelter. Plan and build the infrastructure to make future evacuations safe and healthy from cooling centers to safe and healthy shelter locations. The state of Louisiana must provide free and accessible public transportation to all residents to facilitate evacuations. It should also provide direct payments to people to evacuate.

Build a campaign for Whole-Home Repairs. Climate justice, racial justice, and housing justice organizations have an opportunity to coalesce around shared goals for increased safety and equity through this campaign. Looking to Pennsylvania's Whole-Home Repairs bill as a blueprint, the coalition could build a campaign around a program for owners and renters to repair and weatherize their homes. The program could include funding for staff, pre-apprenticeships, and training programs to develop the workforce to complete the repairs.[84]

Build Green Community Infrastructure.

Implement Stormwater Management Infrastructure on Public Lands: Replace impermeable pavement with permeable pavement on public property across the state; build rain gardens on public property; support urban and non-urban forestry on public lands and right-of-ways.

Develop Incentives to Support Private Development of Green Infrastructure. Develop incentives to build green infrastructure such as green roofs and green walls that support and reinforce one another: subsidies, tax reduction, stormwater fee discounts, sustainability certifications, and building codes.

84. Senator Nikil Saval, "Senator Nikil Saval Celebrates Creation of Whole-Home Repairs Program with $125 Million in State Budget," July 8, 2022, https://www.pasenatorsaval.com/senator-nikil-saval-celebrates-creation-of-whole-home-repairs-program-with-125-million-in-state-budget/.

85. Tiago Liberalesso, Carlos Oliveira Cruz, Cristina Matos Silva, and Maria Manso, "Green infrastructure and public policies: An international review of green roofs and green walls incentives," *Land Use Policy* 96 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.104693.

SUMMARY OF POLICIES

Build Multifunctional Green Community Infrastructure: Build parks, greenways, trails, and more public green spaces to absorb water in all storm events– but also build them to be community assets when there is no flood.

Establish publicly funded and managed coastal reclamation projects. The work performed to protect communities from future storms should be well-paid, stable, place-based, and rely on locally hired workers to ensure people are not forced to move away from their homes to find meaningful and sustaining work.

Build a coalition campaign for a Green New Deal for K-12 Public Schools: The School-to-Prison Pipeline funnels youth out of places of learning in their home communities and into incarceration. Deeply investing in both learning conditions (including buildings and school yards) and working conditions for staff (educators, counselors, nurses, and more) will develop the infrastructure for youth to thrive. A Green New Deal for K-12 Public Schools maps out policies for both green building retrofits for schools and staffing increases as well as policies that resist youth incarceration.[86] Retrofitted schools across Louisiana may also serve as resilience centers in any type of disaster.[87]

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86. Drake et al, "A Green New Deal for K-12 Public Schools," Climate and Community Project, https://www.climateandcommunity.org/gnd-for-k-12-public-schools.

87. See discussion of public housing as resilience centers here: Aldana Cohen et al, "A Green New Deal for Public Housing," Climate and Community Project, https://www.climateandcommunity.org/a-gnd-for-public-housing.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT OVERVIEW

Resistance and activism have always existed within and outside of the carceral system– particularly from the leadership of incarcerated and formerly incarcerated individuals. **Incarcerated, formerly incarcerated people, people who have been affected by carceral practices (such as money bail and policing), and their communities have been holding the light for this work for generations.** Resistance has existed at every level and in many communities across Louisiana, and persists to this day.

At Louisiana State Penitentiary (Angola Farm), activists have been fighting inhumane and unjust conditions for decades. In the 70s, incarcerated individuals organized hunger and work strikes to non-violently protest prison conditions, leading to a retaliatory murder charge which left 3 men–known as the Angola 3– to endure over 114 years of solitary confinement for 40 years.[88] By 2016, all of the Angola 3 had won their release from incarceration, and their story continues to speak to the activism and resilience of incarcerated individuals.

People also fight back outside of incarceration. After Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, 100s of women, almost 80% of them Black, in the street-based economies were charged with "Crime Against Nature by Solicitation (CANS)" which comes with 15-year to life sex offender designation. Organizers at Women With A Vision started the No Justice Project, a multifaceted organizing campaign to fight CANS which included a referral network for people on the sex offender list, community meetings, public presentations, and media interviews. In 2012, nine plaintiffs brought the case to federal court and won the overturning of the statue in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.[89]

Also in New Orleans, Voices of the Experienced (VOTE) won a progressive and anti-discriminatory public housing and Section 8 admissions policy, which allows people with criminal records to move back into public housing sites. In 2016, Louisiana also passed "ban the box" legislation, or House Bill 266, now Act 398, which prevents state government employers from asking about past criminal history on a job application.

People have also won the fight to decrease beds, stopping 1000s of empty beds that could have been filled had they been built. In 2010, the New Orleans Sheriff proposed a plan to build a 6,000 bed facility to replace buildings damaged by Hurricane Katrina using FEMA funding. Through Orleans Parish Prison Reform Coalition's (OPPRC) organizing, the plan was capped at 1,438 beds, around 24% of the original plan.[90] Today, OPPRC fights an additional up to 700-bed proposal (now 89 beds), made under the guise of mental health care and funded by FEMA.[91] The case to fight that construction is now at the US Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit.[92]

Money bail is also a target of past and current organizing. In 2017, OPPRC, led by voices of people affected by money bail, succeeded in pressuring the New Orleans City Council to unanimously pass an ordinance to limit the use of money bail at the city level for most municipal offense[93] effectively eliminating the use of money bail for people arrested on municipal offenses. Later in 2017, the Criminal District Court began a program to release more people without demanding money bail. Since then, the court has also initiated a new process to determine release criteria, leading to some reductions in money bail claims. Furthermore, in 2018, the Juvenile Court ended the practice of money bail and stopped the implementation of conditions of release that cost money to access– such as drug testing. This laid the groundwork for a current campaign to end money bail in Orleans Parish entirely.

ICE incarcerated individuals have also been leading resistance in rural Louisiana. In 2019, a hunger strike at the GEO Group-run Pine Prairie ICE Processing Center faced severe retaliation. A coalition of organizations wrote a complaint to the DHS Inspector General reporting:

88. The Angola 3, "All of the Angola 3 are now Free," Accessed August 22, 2022, https://angola3.org/.

89. Laura McTighe, Deon Haywood, ""There Is NO Justice in Louisiana': Crimes against Nature and the Spirit of Black Feminist Resistance," *A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society,* 19(3) (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/10999949.2017.1389584.

90. Orleans Parish Prison Reform Coalition, "No Jail Expansion: 1,438-Bed Cap," Accessed August 22, 2022, https://opprcnola.org/the-1438bed-cap.

91. Orleans Parish Prison Reform Coalition, "No Jail Expansion Under the Guise of Mental Health Care," Accessed August 22, https://opprcnola.org/phase3.

92. Nick Chrastil, "Public meeting scheduled on controversial Phase III jail facility," *The Lens*, April 15, 2022, https://thelensnola.org/2022/04/15/public-meeting-scheduled-on-controversial-phase-iii-jail-facility/.

93. Orleans Parish Prison Reform Coalition, "End Money Bail," Accessed August 22, 2022, https://opprcnola.org/end-money-bail-campaign.

> "On August 3, 2019, officers at Pine Prairie shot tear gas canisters and rubber bullets at approximately 115 hunger strikers peacefully gathering in the facility's recreation yard.134 Some hunger strikers and protestors were also beaten. At least one protestor required CPR resuscitation after being shot with tear gas. After the attack, individuals reported that ICE locked some of the hunger strikers in solitary confinement and punitively denied them communication with their legal counsel, friends, and families."[94]

This action was followed in 2020, African migrants at Pine Prairie ICE Processing Center led a hunger strike for their freedom and medical care.[95] This hunger strike also faced retaliation in the form of solitary confinement and verbal threats.[96] The complaint, published in 2021, reports even more horrific conditions migrants are fighting including: inhumane conditions, limited access to safe food and water, abusive conditions in solitary confinement, and lack of protection from the COVID-19 pandemic. **From the 70s to today, from jails to ICE detention facilities, incarcerated people have led the movement for their dignity, humanity, and release from the horrific injustices of incarceration.**

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94. Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Center, "To The Honorable Joseph V. Cuffari and Officer Kathy Culliton-Gonzalez," June 21, 2021, https://rfkhr.imgix.net/asset/RFK-Human-Rights-Pine-Prairie-DHS-Complaint.pdf.

95. Frances Madeson, "African asylum seekers jailed in Louisiana stop eating in protest," *Louisiana Illuminator*, August 21, 2020, https://lailluminator.com/2020/08/21/african-asylum-seekers-imprisoned-in-louisiana-stop-eating-in-protest/.

96. Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Center, "To The Honorable Joseph V. Cuffari and Officer Kathy Culliton-Gonzalez," June 21, 2021, https://rfkhr.imgix.net/asset/RFK-Human-Rights-Pine-Prairie-DHS-Complaint.pdf.

CONCLUSION

In the public imagination, climate justice and the abolition of the carceral state are not often discussed in the same breath. Yet, the two are inseparable. Climate justice cannot be thought of solely in terms of reduced emissions or achieved merely through technocratic solutions. It must be imagined by, for, and with communities that are experiencing the brunt of impacts of the climate crisis, which include incarcerated folks who are multiply vulnerable to state, carceral, and environmental violence. That the crises of incarceration and climate change share root causes also make them mutually reinforcing. As such, FEMA funds must be divested from criminalizing and incarcerating functions and invested in increased funding for mitigation and adaptation to increasingly devastating climate disasters. This playbook outlines steps toward decreasing the vulnerability of the communities most impacted by incarceration, and a more just climate future.

Louisiana is not the only state that contends with the overlapping destructions of mass incarceration, the housing crisis, and climate disaster. In deindustrialized regions across the US, including Kentucky and Pennsylvania, prisons are pitched as alternative economic development for rural communities as industries go bankrupt and communities lose their economic drivers. Research has shown that if Kentucky's jail incarceration rate were to continue to rise as it has since 2000, it would only take 113 years before every single Kentuckian was locked up.[97] Changes to the state's criminal justice policies have subsidized impoverished counties by loading funding and people into state jails. Strategies for empowering workers through land reclamation are laid out in the corresponding report for Kentucky, where many of the same abolitionist strategies described in this report would also be relevant. More generally, across regions, need to move away from systems that prioritize punishment– and towards a system that not only has fewer and fewer people serving time in a smaller and smaller carceral system, but also more people living fuller and healthier lives in communities that are more stable and safe in the face of growing threats of climate disasters.

In Pennsylvania, on top of an abandoned strip coal mine and next to a coal ash landfill with over 40 million tons of waste, the carceral facility SCI Fayette has developed capacity for 1,826 incarcerated individuals and a legacy of activism surrounding its

97. Jack Norton and Judah Schept, "Keeping the Lights On:Incarcerating the Bluegrass State," Vera, March 4, 2019, https://www.vera.org/in-our-backyards-stories/keeping-the-lights-on.

toxic adjacency. A report from the Abolitionist Law Center found that 81% of responding incarcerated individuals there reported respiratory, throat and sinus issues, while 68% reported gastrointestinal problems– part of a pattern of symptomatic clusters consistent with exposure to coal waste. Meanwhile, incarcerated individuals were routinely denied their right to medical care. Outside SCI Fayette, activists continue to rally to fight to close the toxic prison and bring justice to its residents.

In Texas, the Karnes County Residential Center (Capacity: 1158) is a migrant detention ICE facility built in the center of an oil and gas region that also boasts PFOAS polluted water. A facility without a project-level environmental assessment, Karnes County Residential Center houses migrant families who are pressured to drink the PFOAS-contaminated water because detainees are not provided free alternatives to tap water. Exposure to PFOA/PFOS can lead to "liver and thyroid disorders, cancer, a multitude of developmental effects, and even death."[99] The facility is managed by the for-profit Geo Group.[100]

While this playbook focuses on Louisiana as the epicenter of hyperincarceration in the US, the impacts of disinvestment, carcerality, and the climate crisis are visible from the Gulf to Appalachia and beyond. Ending these systems will require deep organizing, political education, and coalition building. By bringing climate justice, racial justice, and abolition together, this playbook attempts to move towards a vision of democracy that centers and uplifts communities that have faced the worst devastation from mass incarceration and climate disaster.

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98. David Pellow and Jasmine Vazin, "The Intersection of Race, Immigration Status, and Environmental Justice," *Sustainability* 11, no. 14 (2019), https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/14/3942/htm#B94-sustainability-11-03942.

99. David Pellow and Jasmine Vazin, "The Intersection of Race, Immigration Status, and Environmental Justice," *Sustainability* 11, no. 14 (2019), https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/14/3942/htm#B94-sustainability-11-03942.

100. "KARNES COUNTY RESIDENTIAL CENTER (FORMERLY KARNES COUNTY DETENTION CENTER)," Global Detention Project, 2022, https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/americas/united-states/detention-centres/1470/karnes-county-residential-center-formerly-karnes-county-detention-center.

FURTHER RESOURCES

Incarceration Transparency: This resource provides data and research on incarceration to address significant harms from conditions of incarceration in Louisiana. https://www.incarcerationtransparency.org/

Climate and Punishment: This map uses nearly the same facility dataset as the maps included in this report, but it displays "risk" instead of "adjacency." The maps included in this report show hazards near carceral facilities (adjacency), while The Intercept map shows risk levels of three different hazards (risk). https://theintercept.com/series/climate-and-punishment/

APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY

FIGURE 1

First, we gathered Census and HIFLD data[101] on the location of carceral facilities, comparing them to each other to find overlapping facilities and eliminating the duplicate carceral facilities. Next, we gathered data on environmental hazards including oil and gas wells, different types of pipelines, Superfund sites, sea level rise, power plants, refineries, and more. After gathering the relevant data, we created a buffer of 2500 feet from each site of environmental hazard–a buffer based on organizing in California for safe setbacks from inhabited places.[102] We compared the buffer to sites of carceral facilities to find the overlap. One dataset, sea level rise, was not buffered and was only compared directly with the location of carceral facility sites. Afterward, we compared datasets of adjacencies to find duplicate facilities (facilities with more than one hazard in the buffer)--which are labeled on the map as "Hybrid." Finally, because there were two many types of hazards to shown on one map–hazards were grouped into categories: toxicity (Superfund, air pollution, PFAS potential), legacies of slavery (sites of carceral infrastructure that were formerly plantations that used enslaved labor), fossil fuels (oil and gas wells, HGL pipelines, natural gas pipelines, crude oil pipline, crude oil rail terminals, petroleum products pipelines, and refineries), and Hybrid (any combination of multiple hazards including fossil fuels, toxicity, sea level rise, power plants, and more). The analysis returned 125 sites of carceral facilities in the 2500 foot buffer from a studied environmental hazard out of 170 sites total–nearly 3 out of 4 of all carceral facilities studied in Louisiana.

DATASETS

Fossil Fuels:

US Energy Information Administration, 2020, "Crude Oil Pipelines," Accessed August 28, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/maps/layer_info-m.php.

US Energy Information Administration, 2019, "Crude Oil Rail Terminal," Accessed August 28, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/maps/layer_info-m.php.

US Energy Information Administration, 2020, "HGL Pipelines," Accessed August 28, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/maps/layer_info-m.php.

US Energy Information Administration, 2020, "Natural Gas Interstate and Intrastate Pipelines," Accessed August 28, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/maps/layer_info-m.php.

US Energy Information Administration, 2020, "Petroleum Product Pipelines," Accessed August 28, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/maps/layer_info-m.php.

US Energy Information Administration, 2021, "Petroleum Product Terminals," Accessed August 28, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/maps/layer_info-m.php.

US Energy Information Administration, 2021, "Petroleum Refineries," Accessed August 28, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/maps/layer_info-m.php.

FracTracker Alliance, 2017, "U.S. Oil & Gas Activity" Accessed August 28, 2022, https://www.fractracker.org/map/national/us-oil-gas/.

Toxicity:

US EPA, 2021, "OECA ECHO facilities" Accessed October 10, 2021, https://hub.arcgis.com/datasets/EPA::oeca-echo-facilities-air/about.

Public Emplyoees for Environmental Responsibility, 2022, "PFAS Map," February 23, 2022, https://peer.org/areas-of-work/public-health/pfas/pfas-map/.

US EPA, 2022, "SEMS Search," Accessed February 23, 2022, https://www.epa.gov/enviro/sems-search.[103]

Hybrid(multiple issues intersecting):

US Energy Information Administration, 2021, "Power Plants," Accessed August 28, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/maps/layer_info-m.php.

NOAA, 2021, "Sea Level Rise Data Download," Accessed September 23, 2021, https://coast.noaa.gov/slrdata/.

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101. Homeland Infrastructure Foundation Level Data, "Prison Boundaries," Created June 19, 2020, https://hifld-geoplatform.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets/2d6109d4127d458eaf0958e4c5296b67_0/explore?location=14.768785%2C-9.852691%2C2.39.

102. The original setback was 2500 feet–although activists in California are very close to winning a setback of 3200 feet. See 2500 feet here: https://www.fractracker.org/2019/07/impact-of-a-2500-oil-and-gas-well-setback-in-california/. See 3200 feet here: https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/21/california-moves-to-ban-oil-wells-within-3200-feet-of-homes-schools.html.

103. This source has since been removed from the internet.

104. The dataset used for the analysis was 5 feet of sea level rise.

APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY

FIGURE 2

First, we gathered Census and HIFLD data[105] on the location of carceral facilities, comparing them to each other to find overlapping facilities and eliminating the duplicate carceral facilities. Next, we gathered data on effective and preliminary products from the National Flood Hazard Layer on FEMA's Flood Map Service Center website.[106] Effective products are products that are in use. Preliminary products are still being studied. Some counties in Louisiana did not have data for either product. The floodplain data was then filtered for: Zone A, Zone AO, Zone AH, Zones A1-A30, Zone AE, Zone A99, Zone AR, Zone AR/AE, Zone AR/AO, Zone AR/A1-A30, Zone AR/A, Zone V, Zone VE, and Zones V1-V30, in the FLD_ZONE field. Those zones were then compared to the site of carceral facilities to return at least 54 facilities (out of 170 total) in the floodplains that were analyzed.

105. Homeland Infrastructure Foundation Level Data, "Prison Boundaries," Created June 19, 2020, https://hifld-geoplatform.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets/2d6109d4127d458eaf0958e4c5296b67_0/explore?location=14.768785%2C-9.852691%2C2.39.

106. "FEMA Flood Map Service Center: Search All Products," FEMA, accessed April 2022, https://msc.fema.gov/portal/advanceSearch.

Name	Type	Hazard
CAMERON PARISH JAIL	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
MCDANIELS TRANSITIONAL WORK CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
CALCASIEU PARISH JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
INTAKE PROCESSING CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
MOREHOUSE PARISH DETENTION CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
ORLEANS PARISH PRISON	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
ACADIA PARISH DETENTION CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
ACADIA PARISH JAIL	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
BOSSIER PARISH JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
LAFAYETTE JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
KENNER CITY JAIL	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
WASHINGTON PARISH JAIL	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
B B RAYBURN CORRECTIONAL CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
LIVINGSTON PARISH DETENTION CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
RAYNE CITY JAIL	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
ELAYN HUNT CORRECTIONAL CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
RICHWOOD CORRECTIONAL CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
ST. LANDRY PARISH JAIL	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
ST. MARY PARISH WORK RELEASE FACILITY	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
ST. MARY PARISH WORK RELEASE FACILITY	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
VERMILION PARISH JAIL	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain

Table 2. Facilities on Figure 2 Map

Name	Type	Hazard
LOUISIANA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
JETSON CENTER FOR YOUTH	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
HOUSE OF DETENTION	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
CONCHETTA	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
ORLEANS JUSTICE CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
ORLEANS TEMPORARY DETENTION CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
Acadia Parish Jail	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
Eunice Police Dept	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
Ville Platte Jail	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
Patterson City Jail	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
St Mary Parish Correctional Ctr	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
RICHLAND PARISH DETENTION CENTER-UNIT II	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
PLAQUEMINES PARISH DETENTION CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
GRANT PARISH DETENTION CENTER	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
FCI OAKDALE I	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
RICHLAND PARISH DETENTION CENTER-UNIT I	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
FCI OAKDALE II CAMP	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
FCI OAKDALE II	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
TEMPLEMAN PHASE V	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
Madison Parish Correctional Ctr	Flood Hazard	Effective 100-year Floodplain
TERREBONNE CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMPLEX	Flood Hazard	Preliminary 100-year Floodplain
LAFOURCHE WORK RELEASE CENTER	Flood Hazard	Preliminary 100-year Floodplain
LAFOURCHE PARISH JUVENILE JUSTICE FACILITY	Flood Hazard	Preliminary 100-year Floodplain
LAFOURCHE WORK RELEASE CENTER	Flood Hazard	Preliminary 100-year Floodplain

Table 2. Facilities on Figure 2 Map

Name	Type	Hazard
LAFOURCHE PARISH JUVENILE JUSTICE FACILITY	Flood Hazard	Preliminary 100-year Floodplain
LASALLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER	Flood Hazard	Preliminary 100-year Floodplain
ALEXANDRIA STAGING FACILITY	Flood Hazard	Preliminary 100-year Floodplain
J LEVY DABADIE CORRECTIONAL CENTER	Flood Hazard	Preliminary 100-year Floodplain
AVOYELLES BUNKIE DETENTION CENTER / JUSTICE CENTER	Flood Hazard	Preliminary 100-year Floodplain
LAFOURCHE PARISH DETENTION CENTER	Flood Hazard	Preliminary 100-year Floodplain
CONCORDIA PARISH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY	Flood Hazard	Preliminary 100-year Floodplain
AVOYELLES MARKSVILLE DETENTION CENTER	Flood Hazard	Preliminary 100-year Floodplain
RAPIDES PARISH DETENTION CENTER I	Flood Hazard	Preliminary 100-year Floodplain
RAYMOND LABORDE CORRECTIONAL CENTER	Flood Hazard	Preliminary 100-year Floodplain

Table 2. Facilities on Figure 2 Map



Figure 3: Number of Facilities by Capacity



Figure 4: Beds by Management Type

APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY

COUNTING BEDS

First, we gathered Census and HIFLD data,[107] comparing them to each other to find overlapping facilities and eliminating the duplicate carceral facilities. Next, we gathered bed capacity numbers based on the HIFLD data and filling in with local sources wherever that data was unavailable. Finally, we sorted the data to identify open carceral facilities at multiple levels of management: local, county (parish), state, federal, and multi-type facilities.

Through this data we have identified at least 170 currently open carceral facilities in Louisiana–21 facilities run at the local level level, 123 at the county level, 16 at the state level, 8 at the federal level, and 3 multi-type facilities. Of these facilities, capacity or reported beds remains mostly at the County (Parish) level with 56.7% of beds being managed at the parish level, followed by the state with 28% of the beds. At least one facility is managed privately: Madison Parish Correctional Center which supports 334 beds. This amounts to a total of 73,349 beds across the state of Louisiana.

107. Homeland Infrastructure Foundation Level Data, "Prison Boundaries," Created June 19, 2020, https://hifld-geoplatform.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets/2d6109d4127d458eaf0958e4c5296b67_0/explore?location=14.768785%2C-9.852691%2C2.39.